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The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first point out that violation of rationality axioms (SARP, GARP, WARP) 
do not necessarily lead to a non-rational behavior. Second, our tests of axioms SARP, GARP and WARP over a Polish panel 
data (1987-90) show that over the 3630 households only 240 violate the three axioms. However these 240 violations are not 
caused by the non-respect of demand theory axioms but by the changing of preferences over the period. A logistic regression 
confirms the robustness of the test since the more the real expenditure increases in absolute value, the more the probability of 
violating the axioms increases (the respect of the axioms by the 3390 households is not due to an increase of the real 
expenditure). Moreover, changing in the composition of the family structure increases the probability of being inconsistent. It 
seems therefore that the 240 apparent violations are due to the appearance of new constraints, which increase the shadow 
prices of the goods. In order to explain these 240 households’ preference changes, we build an econometric model of prices 
including an observed monetary component and an unobserved non-monetary component expressing the constraints faced by 
the agent. The estimation of this econometric model shows that the agents who apparently violate the axioms have these 
complete price changes superior to those of the agents who respect the axioms. Thus the agents who apparently violate the 




Dans cet article nous montrons d’abord que la violation  des axiomes de rationalité des préférences revelées  
(SARP, GARP, WARP) ne correspond pas nécessairement à des comportements non rationnels. Nous testons ces 
axiomes sur les données individuelles de 3630 ménages du panel polonais (1987-1990) ;  240 ménages violent 
les trois axiomes, mais on montre que ces violations ne sont pas la conséquence d’une contradiction  aux 
axiomes de la théorie de la demande mais sont entraînés par la modification des préférences individuelles 
pendant cette période. Une analyse logistique montre que la probabilité de violation des axiomes augmente avec 
l’accroissement du revenu réel de ménage ce qui confirme la robustesse de ce test non-paramétrique de la 
rationalité. La probabilité de violation dépend également des modifications démographiques des ménages. On 
fait l’hypothèse que ces violations apparentes sont dues à l’apparition des nouvelles contraintes de choix qui se 
traduisent par  l’apparition des prix virtuels. L’estimation de ces prix virtuels se fait par la considération des  
biais d’endogénéité dans l’estimation  en cross-section, c’est à dire par la comparaison  des estimations en coupe 
et en dynamique.  L’étude confirme que les ménages qui violent apparemment ces axiomes de rationalité 
subissent des variations de prix virtuels nettement supérieures aux non-violeurs. Ceci semble indiquer qu’ils 
subissent pendant cette période des modifications plus fortes de leurs ressources non-monétaires et de leurs 
contraintes de choix. 
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Non-parametric tests applied to aggregate time series data confirm, in general, the hypothesis 
of a representative agent maximizing utility function. Neither Varian (1982) analyzing aggregate 
consumption data, nor Swofford and Whitney (1986) who analyze quarterly data on monetary assets in 
the USA for the period 1969:1-1979:4, found a violation
1 of the GARP axiom (Generalized Axiom of 
Revealed Preference). Chalfant and Alston (1988), analyzing US meat demand from 1947 to 1983 and 
Australian quarterly meat demand from 1961:1 to 1984:4, test the consistency of the data with an 
axiom called SARP (Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference) which is more restrictive than GARP. 
They find no violation for the US and only two violations for Australia. The reason for such a result 
over aggregate times series data are now well-known : when using aggregate data, few or no budget 
hyperplans intersect, leading to a trivial respect of GARP. 
 
On the contrary, non-parametric tests performed over micro-economic data do not give a clear 
cut answer about the issue of the respect by consumers of rationality axioms (GARP, SARP, WARP). 
For instance, Mattei (1994) using a monthly Swiss Consumer Panel Data (1975-89)
2 shows that half 
the households and all households, whose choices have been recorded during at least 60 months, 
violate GARP. Especially the 19 households whose choices have been recorded from 1975 to 1989 
violate GARP. Sippel (1997, page 1443) over two experimental consumer data sets of respectively 12 
and 30 individuals, concludes the following: "We find a considerable number of violations of the 
revealed preference axioms, which contradicts the neo-classical theory of the consumer maximising 
utility subject to budget constraint. We should therefore pay closer attention to the limits of this theory 
as a description of how people actually behave, i.e. as a positive theory of consumer behaviour". The 
author indeed finds out in his first experiment, 11 individuals (over a total of 12) who violate SARP 
and 5 individuals (41.7%) who violate GARP. He also finds out in his second experiment, 22 
individuals (over a total of 30) who violate SARP and 19 who violate GARP. However an original
3 
paper by Février and Visser (2000) over two experimental data sets of respectively 60 and 60 
individuals finds out "only" 35 (over 120) individuals (29%) who violate GARP. Moreover Famulari 
(1995) using repeated cross-sections of households from the 1982-1985 Consumer Expenditure 
Survey
4 divided into mutually exclusive 43 demographic groups according to eight demographic 
characteristics finds out that 42 households groups respect GARP. 
While it is easy to compare the works of Sippel (1997) and Février and Visser (2000), because they 
both use experimental data, it is not easy to compare the work of Mattei (1994) and the one of 
Famulari (1995). The first difference concerns the nature of the data. Famulari uses a micro-economic 
                                                           
1However some violations are found over some subsets of the entire data, simply indicating general interaction between monetary assets. 
2It includes actually several overlapped panel data over the period since only 19 households remain from 1975 to 1989. 
3The subjects are not, like usual, recruited from the university staff or students, but are randomly selected from DIJON (France) population. 








































8data and groups the households in order to do her tests. Hence the individuals she considers are in fact 
groups of households, while Mattei uses a panel data. The second difference is a methodological one. 
To decide whether an household violate an axiom, Famulari uses the concept of violation rate that can 
be found in Varian (1990). In order to understand this concept, let us recall that non-parametric tests 
are non-probabilistic therefore we should reject the null hypothesis (that is, the agent respects the 
axiom) if we find only one violation of the axiom. For instance in Mattei’s study, a household from 
1975 to 1989 faced 180 different bundles and the maximal number of comparisons is 16110 (C ). 
However we should conclude that the agent violates GARP if we find only one violation over 16110. 
A violation rate of an axiom (for instance GARP) is the number of violation divided by the number of 
pairs belonging to the revealed preference relation. Varian (1990) has proposed the usual 5% as cut-
off. Hence the 42 groups of households, which respect GARP in Famulari’s study, do not have a 




The purpose of this paper is twofold. First we ask a question about the theoretical content of 
the non-parametric tests: does violation of a rationality axiom (SARP, GARP or WARP) necessarily 
mean an irrational behavior  from the individual? The answer is no. On the one hand, because 
rationality in the basic sense of choice function theory (Richter 1971) from which demand theory is 
derived, only requires choices to coincide with the elements optimal with respect to the agent’s 
preference. Hence the preference relation of an agent rational in the sense of Richter does not need to 
be transitive. Such an agent with non-transitive preference will however violate SARP and GARP.  
On the other hand, an agent who is a utility function maximizer and changes her preference over the 
period covered by the test, will violate SARP, GARP and WARP. Such a violation of rationality 
axioms is only apparent and simply expresses preferences changing, not a true irrationality. 
The second purpose is to test the axioms over an interesting panel data (Polish Consumer Panel Data 
1987-1990) concerning a period with very high price variations and less real income variations. Thus 
bugdet hyperplans’ intersections are likely to occur, so are violations of the axioms. We find out that 
all the 3630 households respect the rationality axioms and the 240 households who apparently violate 
them, actually change their preferences over the period which includes a shift from a centrally planned 
economy to a market oriented one. We explain these preferences changing using an econometric 
model, by a change of the agents’ shadow prices through drastic changes of their non-monetary 
resources and the arise of new constraints. 
 
The paper includes 6 sections. Section 2 introduces the non-parametric tests. We make in this 
section a typology of behaviors when performing a simultaneous test of SARP, GARP and WARP. 
Section 3 is devoted to the Polish Consumer Panel Data (1987-90). Section 4 deals with the non-
                                                                                                                                                                                     








































8parametric tests’ results and in section 5 we estimate a parametric econometric model of complete 
prices to explain the 240 households who apparently violate the axioms but actually change their 
preferences. Section 6 discusses the main conclusions. 
 
 




In this paper, we use various non-parametric tests (tests of SARP, GARP and WARP) of 
demand theory. We test for instance the GARP axiom (Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference) 
which is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a utility function (concave, 
continuous, differentiable, and satisfying the insatiability hypothesis) maximizing the choices revealed 
by the data (Varian 1982). The test is called non-parametric, as opposed to parametric tests which are 
built by the estimation of the parameters of a pre-specified utility function. Thus the parametric tests 
of utility function maximizing are joint tests: the utility function has a specific functional form and 
agents maximize this function. So it is difficult to know whether the rejection of the null hypothesis is 
due to the specification of the utility function or to the utility function maximization hypothesis. In 
non-parametric test, there is of course no need to specify the utility function. 
The theoretical works on non-parametric tests began with Afriat (1967). Diewert (1973), and Diewert 
and Parkan (1985) made essential contributions. However, from a practical point of view, Varian 




Let D be a data set including prices Pi  (vectors of R
n
+) and bundles of goods Xi  (vectors of 
R
n
+) purchased at price Pi. Let us set the binary relation denoted R, called revealed preference, and 
defined by : Xi R Xj  ⇔ XiPi ≥ XjPi . The interpretation is that the bundle Xi is revealed preferred to 
the bundle Xj if the bundle Xi is chosen while bundle Xj could have been chosen (Xi has a total 
expenditure evaluated at price Pi superior to the total expenditure of bundle Xj evaluated at price Pi). 
One defines also the following relation RS (called strict revealed preference) : Xi RS Xj  ⇔ XiPi > 
XjPi , where the bundle Xi is available at price Pi . 
 








































8The SARP axiom (Ville 1946, Houthakker 1950) requires TR to be antisymmetric
5 : Xi TR Xj, i≠j ⇒ 
not(Xj TR Xi) while the GARP axiom requires the bilateral asymmetry of TR and RS : Xi TR Xj ⇒ 
not(Xj RS Xi). WARP requires the revealed preference relation R to be antisymmetric: Xi R Xj, i≠j ⇒ 
not(Xj R Xi). 
 
The empirical tests of the axioms are quite easy. For instance in the case of GARP, we perform the 
following procedure: 
1.  We build the revealed preference relation R. 
2.  We build the strict revealed preference RS. 
3.  We build the transitive closure TR of R by an algorithm of least cost path called the Dijkstra 
algorithm. 
4.  For each couple (Xi, Xj) belonging to TR, (i.e. such that Xi TR Xj), we test if  (Xj, Xi) belongs to 
RS, that is to say if Xj RS Xi. If yes then this couple violates GARP and we add 1 to the number of 
GARP violations. 
 
It is obvious that SARP implies GARP and WARP. However there is no relationship between 
GARP and WARP except in two-dimensional Euclidean space where the three axioms are equivalent 
(Samuelson 1948, Rose 1958). Let us now set that for finite cases, the below axioms and implications 
are equivalent (see Samuelson 1948, Afriat 1967, Shafer 1975). 
 
Axiom     Implications
 
SARP      Stable linear (transitive, antisymmetric and complete) preference, there exists  
a utility function that rationalizes the data, there exists a demand function that  
rationalizes the data. 
GARP      Stable  preorder (transitive and complete) preference, there exists a utility  
function that rationalizes the data, there exists a demand correspondence that 
rationalizes the data. 
WARP      Stable complete and antisymmetric preference, there exists a function that  
rationalizes the data (but nothing can be said about the nature of this  
function). 
 
It is easy to see that the test of one of the above three axioms is not enough to give us an 
information about the rationality of an agent’s behavior. For instance the violation of GARP over a 
data set may be due to, either the violation of the optimizing behavior (the agent does not choose the 
                                                           








































8best element with respect to her preference relation), either the violation of the stability of preference 
over the period (the agent changes her preference) or the violation of the transitivity and completeness 
of preference axioms. Let us take an agent who is a utility function maximizer (preorder preference 
maximizer) but who changes her preference over the period covered by the data set. Then the test will 
conclude that she violates GARP over this period (indeed the displayed preference relation is not her 
true preference), despite the fact that she is obviously rational. 
 
At this stage, let us recall that the basic definition of rational choice set by Richter (1971) in 
choice function theory
6 does not impose any constraint over the structure of the revealed preference (in 
particular, it does not impose a priori the transitivity of the revealed preference relation). An agent is 
rational if she chooses the elements optimal with respect to her preferences.  
Let us now take an agent with stable preference over a period and who respects the optimization 
principle (that is the agent is rational with respect to the basic definition of Richter, 1971). Suppose 
that there exist different x1 , x2 and x3 , such that x1 PR x2 , x2 PR x3 and x1 IR x3 , where R is the agent’s 
revealed preference relation, PR and IR are respectively the asymmetric and symmetric components
7 of 
R. Then SARP, GARP and WARP will be violated, leading to the false conclusion that the agent is not 
rational.  
 
It is therefore important to be careful about the conclusions we derive from the tests and not 
take for granted that a violation of an axiom necessarily means an irrational behavior. We argue 
thereafter that the simultaneous tests of SARP, GARP and WARP can improve, a little bit, our 
understanding of an agent behavior over a given period. 
 
 
2.3 Simultaneous Tests of SARP, GARP and WARP : A Typology of Behaviors 
 
First we make the test of SARP. Two cases occur : 
1.  The agent respects SARP then she maximizes a stable linear preference over the period. 
2.  The agent does not respect SARP then we start two tests : 
2.1. Test of GARP : two cases occur. 
2.1.1. The agent fulfills GARP then she maximizes a stable preorder preference over 
the period. Since the agent violates SARP, the symmetric part of her preference 
relation (reflexivities excluded) is not empty. 
2.1.2. The agent does not respect GARP then two cases occur: 
                                                           
6Demand theory is derived from choice function theory. 








































82.1.2.1.  The set of SARP violating couples is equal
8 to the set of GARP 
violating couples, then assuming
9 that the agent fulfills the optimizing 
condition leads
10 to the conclusion that the agent respects SARP, GARP 
and WARP but has changed her preference at least once over the period: 
the apparent violations of SARP and GARP (and WARP) are due to 
preference instability, not to preference structure. 
2.1.2.2. The set of SARP violating couples is not equal to the set of GARP 
violating couples, then the agent both violates GARP and SARP. However 
even if we assume rationality in the sense of Richter (optimizing 
condition), violation of GARP and SARP may simply be apparent (that is 
violations are due to instability of preference)
11 or may be a true one 
(violations are due to preference structure i.e. preference is not transitive). 
 
2.2. Test of WARP : two cases occur. 
2.2.1.  The agent fulfills WARP then she maximizes a stable complete and 
antisymmetric preference over the period. However since the agent violates SARP, 
this preference relation is not transitive. This agent is rational despite the fact her 
preference is not transitive. She maximizes other types of "utility" functions called 
variable interval functions f(x,y) = u(x) + s(x,y) where u is a standard utility 
function and s is a threshold function defined from the set of objects to R
+ (see 
Diaye 1999). 
2.2.2. The agent does not fulfill WARP then two cases occur: 
2.2.2.1. The set of SARP violating couples is equal to the set of WARP 
violating couples, then we get the same conclusion as in 2.1.2.1. 
2.2.2.2. The set of SARP violating couples is not equal to the set of WARP 
violating couples, then the agent both violates SARP and WARP. Like in case 
2.1.2.2, even if we assume rationality in the sense of Richter (optimizing 
condition), violation of WARP and SARP may be
12 a true one (violations are 
due to preference structure i.e. preference is not transitive) or may simply be 
apparent (that is, violations are due to instability of preference). 
 
                                                           
8Let us recall that since SARP implies GARP then the set of GARP violating couples is included in the set of SARP violating couples. 
9There is a large consensus, among the theorists, about this assumption (see for instance Russell and Tengesdal 2001). 
10Proof in Appendix I. 
11Counter-example in Appendix II. 








































82.4 Power of the non-parametric tests 
 
Non-parametric tests are non-probabilistic and their power is unknown. The first theoretical 
answer to this issue consists in trying to give a probabilistic background to the non-parametric tests 
(Varian 1985, Epstein and Yatchew 1985). Other methods try both to take into account the non-
probabilistic dimension of the non-parametric tests and to improve their power, have been developed. 
We can mention the method we call Power in the sense of Bronars. This method developed by 
Bronars (1987) (see also Aizcorbe 1991) compares the results of the non-parametric tests over a given 
data set with the results obtained by non-parametric tests over a data set where the agents choose 
randomly in the sense of Becker (that is they choose their consumption bundles randomly with respect 
to a uniform law). 
 
Moreover two main questions arise concerning the data: does the consistency I find, a true 
one ? and does the violation I find, a true violation ? Indeed some couples of bundles trivially respect 
GARP (or SARP, or WARP) and other trivially violates it.  
 
A couple (Xi, Xj)  trivially respects GARP when the total expenditure of Xi evaluated at 
constant price is sharply "greater" than the one of Xj evaluated at the same constant price. Indeed, we 
will have XiPi > XjPi and XiPj > XjPj. The couple (Xi, Xj)  trivially violates GARP if the total 
expenditure of Xi and Xj evaluated at the available price Pi is "similar". The consumer will therefore 
consider these two bundles as identical. This leads to XiPi ≥ XjPi and XjPj > XiPj. 
 
Concerning the trivially consistent couples, we will use a method developed by Famulari 
(1995). She chooses a reference price Po and evaluates all the consumption vectors at this price. The 
total expenditure of a vector Xi evaluated at this constant price Po , will be denoted Mi = Po.Xi . If a 
bundle Xi is much more expensive (in the sense of Mi) than a bundle Xj, it will probably be preferred, 
therefore taking into account the comparison of these two bundles will arbitrary increase the number 
of couples consistent with GARP. According to Famulari, the couple (Xi , Xj) worthy respects GARP 
if the following index I = 2×(Mi - Mj)/(Mi + Mj) is less than a threshold K arbitrary defined by the 
experimenter. Like her, we will take four different levels for K: 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%. The 
interpretation is the following, if K = x%, it means that we will take into account only the couples 
whose total expenditures evaluated at constant price Po are different by at most x%. 
 
Concerning the trivial cases of GARP violation, we will use a method by Afriat (1967) who 
proposes to use for the experiments, the relation Rε , sub-relation of R, defined by : Xi R ε X j  ⇔  








































8(Varian 1990). Some generalizations of this concept can be found, in Varian (1990) who allows ε to be 
different with respect to the bundles (the parameters ε are therefore called Afriat generalized indexes), 
in Gross (1990) or in Famulari (1995). Other methods can be found in Gross (1995a, 1995b) or 
Blundell et al. (1997). 
 
3. The Data 
 
Household budget surveys have been conducted in Poland for many years. In the analyzed 
period, the annual total sample size was about 30 thousand households, which represent approximately 
0.3% of all households in Poland. The data were collected by a rotation method on a quarterly basis. 
The master sample consists of households and persons living in randomly selected dwellings. To 
generate it, a two stage, and in the second stage, two phase sampling procedure was used. The full 
description of the master sample generating procedure is given by Kordos and Kubiczek (1991).  
 
Master samples for each year contain data from four different sub-samples. Two sub-samples 
started to be surveyed in 1986 and ended the four years survey period in 1989. They were replaced by 
new sub-samples in 1990. Another two sub-samples of the same size were started in 1987 and 
followed through 1990. Over this four-year period on every annual sub-sample it is possible to identify 
households participating in the surveys during all four years. The checked and tested number of 
households is 3736. However 3630 households remain in the data set after deleting households with 
missing values. The available information is as detailed as for the cross-sectional surveys: all typical 
socio-economic characteristics of households and individuals are present, as well as details on income 
and expenditures. Household expenditures are aggregated into nine categories: Food, Alcohol and 
Tobacco, Culture, Energy, Clothes, Housing, Medical Care and Hygiene, Transportation and 
Communication, "Other". 
Finally, a large part of this panel containing demographic and income variables is included 
into comparable international database of panels in the frame of PACO project (Luxembourg) and is 
publicly available. 
 
Prices and price indices are those reported by the Polish Statistical Office (GUS) for main 
expenditure items. They are quarterly observed and differentiated by 4 social categories: workers, 
retired, farmers, and dual activity persons (farmers and workers). This distinction covers implicitly 
the geographical differentiation: workers and retired live mostly in large and average size cities, 
farmers live in the countryside and dual activity persons live mostly in the countryside and in small 
towns. The individual price index differences can be interpreted as a consequence of the behavioral 
specificity due to the social class, life cycle and consumption needs. The regional differentiation is less 








































8whole country (1987-1989). Only the coexisting free (or parallel) markets might have created an 
influence on regional average price differences. These differences are taken into account through 
social differentiation. 
  
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in Appendix III present descriptive information on the Polish data. The 
period 1987-1990 covered by the Polish panel is unusual even in Polish economic history. It represents 
the shift from a centrally planned, rationed economy (1987) to a relatively unconstrained fully liberal 
market economy (1990). GDP grew by 4.1% between 1987 and 1988, but fell by .2% between 1988 
and 1989 and by 11.6% between 1989 and 1990. Price increases across these pairs of years were 
60.2%, 251.1% and 585.7%, respectively. Thus, the transitory years 1988 and 1989 produced a period 
of a very high inflation and a mixture of free-market, shadow and administrated economy. 
 
 
4. The Results of the Non-parametric Tests 
 
4.1. Tests of SARP, GARP and WARP 
 
The main result is that for any household who violates one of the three axioms, the set of 
SARP violating couples is equal to the set of GARP violating couples and to the set of WARP 
violating couples. Moreover, over the 3630 households, 3390 respect the axioms and only 240 violate 
the three axioms and the average number of violation (among the 240 households) is 2.295. However 
the violations of SARP, GARP and WARP by these 240 households are due to preference change (see 
point 2.1.2.1 of our discussion in section 2.2). Hence the 3630 households respect the rationality 
axioms. The 240, which apparently violate the axioms, in fact respect them but change their 
preference at least once over the period. 
 
Table 1. 
Simultaneous tests of SARP, GARP and WARP. 
 
  Respect of SARP, GARP and WARP : 
Nbviol (number of violation) = 0 
Non Respect of SARP, GARP and 
WARP : Nbviol ≠ 0 
 
Number of households  3390  240 
Means of Nbviol  0  2.295 
Std-error of Nbviol  0  0.928 
Min. of Nbviol  0  2 










































84.2. Robustness of the Tests 
 
Let us discuss now the robustness of our results and let us first discuss about the robustness 
concerning the 3390 households, which respect the three axioms. Like we have said above in section 
2.4, a couple (Xi , Xj) trivially respects the axioms when the total expenditure of Xi evaluated at 
constant price is sharply "greater" than the one of Xj evaluated at the same constant price. When taking 
into account only the couples whose total expenditures evaluated at constant price P0 are different by 
at most K = 20%, 94.2% of the initial 3390 households remains consistent. For K = 15%, 10% and 
5%, the figures are respectively 83.5%, 63.4% and 33.5%. The results concerning the households 
fulfilling the axioms look robust since even at K = 5%, a large proportion of households is still 
consistent with the axioms. Moreover a logistic regression (see Table 3.3 in Appendix III) shows that 
the more the variation in absolute value of real expenditure per UC, the more the probability of 
violating the axioms. Thus the increase of real expenditure is not, ceteris paribus, a cause of 
respecting the axioms. 
 
Table 2.  
Simultaneous tests of SARP, GARP and WARP  
when removing from the revealed preference relation R the couples (Xi, Xj) such that the total 
expenditures Xi of and Xj calculated at constant price are different by at most K%. 
 
  Respect of SARP, GARP and WARP : 
Nbviol = 0 
 





Let us now discuss about the robustness of the 240 households, which violate the axioms. 
Table 3 below gives the results of the Afriat Efficiency test. At ε = 0.99, 54.6% of the 240 households 
still violate the axioms but at ε = 0.87, none of them violate. However at ε = 0.87 almost all the 3630 









































8Table 3.  
Afriat Efficiency Tests over the 240 households violating SARP, GARP and WARP. 
 
  Non Respect of SARP, GARP and 
WARP : Nbviol ≠ 0 
 
ε = 1.00  240 households 
ε = 0.99  131 households 
ε = 0.98  84 
ε = 0.97  48 
ε = 0.96  30 
ε = 0.95  18 
ε = 0.94  12 
ε = 0.93  8 
ε = 0.92  6 
ε = 0.91  3 
ε = 0.90  2 
ε = 0.89  1 
ε = 0.88  1 
ε = 0.87  0 
 
Finally the power of the test in the sense of Bronars seems good since the number of SARP violating 
households over 10 random samples increases of 155.5% (613.3 households on average over the 10 
random samples, see table 4 below). Each random sample includes four surveys: 1987, 1988, 1989, 
1990. For any survey t, we build ten data sets  ( ) DX P ni i it o =
=
~ ,
13 6 3 0 , n = 1 to 10, in the following 
way : for any agent i, 
•  () ~ ~ ,~ ,....~ Xx x x ii i i =
12 9  such that ~ xi
j  (j = 1 to 9 categories of goods) is the realization of a random 
variable that follows a uniform law [ ] ab
jj ,  with  aM  and  a , with  = 
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Simultaneous tests of SARP over a 10 random samples in the sense of Becker 
(standard-error in parenthesis) 
 
  Non-Respect of SARP : Nbviol ≠ 0 
 
Number of households  (means)  613.3 
(20.14) 
Means of Nbviol  2.63 
(1.63) 
Min. of Nbviol  2 
Max. of Nbviol  12 
 
 
Table 5.  
Afriat Efficiency Tests over the households violating SARP  
over the 10 random samples. 
 
  Sample  I  II  III IV V  VI VII  VIII IX X 
 
ε = 1  590  611 617 590 615 648 643 612 615 592 
ε = 0.99  420  457 440 428 453 472 464 431 462 439 
ε = 0.98  318  335 306 305 325 336 341 311 322 308 
ε = 0.94  70  87  83  89 102 95 100 84  88  73 
ε = 0.90  16  15 22 20 22 21 23 13 19 15 
ε = 0.87  5  6 4 7 6 4 3 4 1 4 
ε = 0.86  4  3 2 5 4 1 2 3 1 2 
ε = 0.85  2  2 1 3 2 1 2 1 0 0 
ε = 0.84  1  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
ε = 0.83  1  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
ε = 0.82  1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 










































84.3. Characteristics of the violating households 
 
A Logit estimation on the violations (Table 3.3 in Appendix III) shows that no classic socio-
economic characteristics such as the household’s demographic structure and location, the head’s age, 
profession or education and the survey’s quarter is significant (at 5%) to predict violations
13. The 
retired people are the only social category for which a significant increase in violation probability is 
observed. 
On the other hand the violations are strongly related to the changes in the household’s 
economic and demographic situation: there is a positive and significant relationship between the 
probability of axiom violation and the change in real per consumer unit total expenditure in observed 
periods between 1987 and 1990. The effect is the strongest and the most significant for the last period 
(1989-90), which coincides with the economic transition shock in Poland. Thus both factors contribute 
in the violation process: the way the change in individual well being is taken into account in 
individual’s behavior and the impact of structural changes in the whole economy. In the period 1989-
1990 a dramatic loss in the purchasing power is accompanied by a shift from a rationing situation on 
the consumption goods market to an almost equilibrium situation. The other significant effect is the 
change of family size (especially again in the period 1989-1990), which increases the probability of 
violation. 
 
The violating and non-violating households may not differ with respect to their average 
characteristics (as suggested by the logit estimation) but may behave differently when facing a change 
in income, relative prices or other determinants of their consumption. To check this, we estimate a 
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System over the pooled surveys.  
The estimation of the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System QUAIDS was made by the 
convergence algorithm proposed by Banks et al. (1997) :  
(4.3.1)  wiht = αi + Σj γij ln pjt + βi ln [mht/a(pt)] + {[λi/b(pt)] ln [mht/a(pt)]}
2 + Wht.γi + uiht 
  with  ln a(pt) =  α0 + Σi αi ln pit + 0.5 ΣiΣj γij ln pit.ln pjt     and    b(pt) = Πi pit
βi  
where wiht is the budget share for good i, individual h and period t, pit the price of good i at period t, 
mht the total expenditure of individual h at period t. As the estimated parameters αi, βi, γij enter non-
linearly into the equation, a first step consists to estimate equation (4.3.1) using a Stone price index 
a(pt) = Πi p it
w wi  with wi the average budget share of good i over individuals and periods (that is, 
imposing α0 = γij = 0 and αi = wi). Price elasticities are corrected to take into account the difference 
between the exact price index a(pt) and the Stone index, as described by Pashardes (1990). In the 
                                                           
13This result remains true when restricting the estimation to those households for which the expenditure evaluated at constant price change 








































8second step, the estimated γij and βi are used to compute b(pt). At each step, b(pt) is updated and the 
system is linear in parameters.  
Blundell and Robin (1999) prove the consistency and asymptotic efficiency of this iterative 
procedure to the maximum likelihood estimate. The estimation is made under additivity, and 
homogeneity restrictions, despite homogeneity is not accepted by the data except for clothing (results 
are similar when homogeneity is not constrained). The cross-section and time-series parameters are 
estimated by pooling the four surveys with quarter and period dummies to take into account all 
institutional changes. Cross-section parameters are estimated on pooled cross-section (third iteration) 
and the time-series parameters on first differences (third iteration) because the usual between and 
within transforms do not converge
14. 
We find (Table 3.4 in Appendix III) that income elasticities are significantly greater for the 
violating households concerning Food at Home, and smaller concerning dynamic expenditures such as 
Food away from Home. These differences are not significant for cross-section estimates, because of 
the endogeneity bias due to the correlation between the specific effects and the relative income. They 
are, on the contrary, significant for the first difference estimates, which cancel this endogeneity bias. 
Thus probably, either the income distribution and the structure of income changes (for instance as far 
as the transitory and permanent changes are concerned) differ between the two populations, or the 
food expenditures of the violating households are more sensitive to income changes (since these 
violating households are subject to a subsistence constraint during this period
15).  
 
  As far as the level of well being is concerned, the violating households have a smaller total 
expenditure than the non-violating, by 3.7%, 3.1% and 7.4% in the first three years. Compared to a 
prediction (for the whole population) by variables such as age,  family composition,  location, 
profession and education, their total expenditures are smaller by 2.5 to 4.9% between the first three 
years, and greater by 3.5 in 1990
16. Moreover, both income and total expenditures increase less for the 
violating households between 1988 and 1989 (+23.0% versus +32.3% for disposable income per unit 
of consumption, +2.6% versus +6.7% for total expenditures) but decrease much less between 1989 and 
90 (-32.7% versus -39.0, -21.3 versus -34.1). Similar variations are observed for low-income families. 
Thus, the violating households seem to have a smaller level of well being, at least between 1987 and 
89, and to have been confronted to a different pattern of variation of their well being during this 
period.  
                                                           
14Probably because of the high degree of non-linearity over the integrability terms b(p). Moreover the estimation on first differences 
eliminates the endogeneity bias by canceling the specific effects between two periods (recall that the within transform only cancels the 
specific effect over the whole period). 
15Despite their smaller level of well-being, their budget share for food consumption is not systematically greater than the budget share of the 
non-violating households or than the budget share predicted by the quadratic demand system. Note that, as their income parameters differ 
from those of the non-violating, this estimation is actually misspecified. 








































8That leads to the question whether the violating households were specifically confronted (compared to 
the non-violating) to some constraints such as subsistence constraints for the poor in particular. 
 
To estimate the number of poor, first, we compute the proportion of households having less 
than the average income minus its standard error. The rich are defined as households having more than 
the average income plus its standard error. The violating population contains much more “rich” than 
the non-violating (21.7% versus 16.3% in 1987) and a little more “poor”. Actually the income 
distribution of the violating population is more polarized: the income variation coefficient is 12.3 for 
the violating versus 9.5 for the non-violating. Second, we define the poor using a composite index 
matching three criteria: an income smaller than the first quintile of the whole population, total 
expenditure smaller (by 25% in Table 3.5) than the average expenditure for the reference population 
(defined by age, education, location, socio-professional category and family structure), and food 
budget share greater than 25% of the average share for this reference population (see Gardes et al. 
2000, for a discussion of this definition
17), the violating contains more rich and a bit more poor than 
the non-violating. More important, one half of the households switches to another social class (for 
instance from the poor class to the quasi-poor) during the whole period, especially between 1988 and 
1989, both for the violating and the non-violating (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6). This indicates that these 
violating households have been confronted to new conditions of living and new constraints during the 
whole period. 
Thus, the violation process may be explained as a coherent response to the changing economic 
position of the household. 
The next step of this paper is to build a model of subsistence constraints and shadow prices, 
allowing explaining theoretically apparent irrationalities among poor households with a strong 
decrease in income. 
 
 




Polish households were confronted to drastic subsistence constraints during these four years. 
Indeed, their level of well-being was very influenced by inflation and macroeconomic shocks: between 
1988 and 1989, the real income per U.C. for households belonging to the first quartile decreased by 
30% and increased by the same amount for households belonging to the last quartile. The inverse 
change occurred between 1989-90. Such constraints correspond to shadow price effects, which may 
                                                           








































8strongly influence household’s consumption and saving decisions. In such a situation, monetary prices 
no longer explain alone the household choices. 
 Suppose  that  monetary price and two shadow prices corresponding respectively to non-
monetary resources and to constraints faced by the households are combined together into a complete 
price. Expressed in logarithm form, we have:  
pc = pm + pnm + pcs where pc denotes the (logarithm of the) complete price, pm denotes the (logarithm of 
the) monetary price, pnm denotes the (logarithm of the) shadow price corresponding to non-monetary 
resources and pcs denotes the (logarithm of the) shadow price corresponding to constraints faced by the 
households. However it is not possible with our data to distinguish between the two components of the 
shadow price π = pnm + pcs. 
 
We want to test the assumption that the 240 violating households faced during this period a 
change in their shadow prices through drastic modifications of their non-monetary resources (such as a 
substitution between the monetary and non-monetary component of price due to the existence of 
queuing) and the appearance of new constraints (such as subsistence constraints which increase the 
non-monetary prices of the constrained goods).  
 
5.2 Measuring the Shadow Prices 
 
Suppose that two estimations of the same equation : xiht = Zht.βi + uiht, for good i (i = 1 to n),  
household h (with h = 1 to H) in period t (t = 1 to T), with Zht = (Z1ht, Z2ht), are made on cross-section 
and time-series over the same data-set. Let us set uiht = αih + εiht where αih is the specific effect which 
contains all permanent components of the residual for individual h and good i. As discussed by 
Mundlak (1970), the cross-section estimates can be biased by a correlation between the explanatory 
variables Z1ht and this specific effect. Such a correlation is due to latent permanent variables (such as 
an event during the infancy, characteristics of parents or permanent wealth). This correlation comes 
from the relationship existing between such latent variables and some explanatory variables Z1ht in the 
cross-section : for instance, the relative income position of the household can be related to its wealth 
or to its inheritance. Those effects are embedded in the specific effect. Thus, the correlation δi between 
the time average of the vector of the explanatory variables, Z1ht = (z
k
1ht )k=1 to K1 , transformed by the 
Between matrix: BZ1ht = {(1/T) Σtz
k
1ht}k=1 to K1, and the specific effect αih , αih = BZ1ht.δi + ηih , will add 
to the parameter βi of these variables in the time average estimation : Bxiht = BZ1ht.(βi + δi) + ηih + 
Bεiht, so that the between estimates are biased. The difference between the cross-section and the time-
series estimates amounts to δi. 
Let us now assume that the shadow price πiht of good i for household h in period t, depends on 








































8that is πiht = fi(Z1ht, Z2ht) (equation 5.2.1). Let us assume also that the consumption function for good i 
is xiht = gi(pht, Z1ht, Z2ht, Sht) (equation 5.2.2) with pht the vector of prices pjht containing (if it exists) a 
shadow, unknown component πjht, and Sht the vector of all other determinants. 
From the shadow price function πiht = fi(Z1ht, Z2ht) = Z1ht.θ1 + Z2ht.θ2 + λih + µiht ,  we define a 
vector of endogeneous variables Z1ht as a vector of all variables correlated with the specific effect λih . 
For instance, the relative income position of the household, supposed to be invariant, can determine its 
location, which is correlated with purchase constraints. Thus the household’s relative income may be 
related to permanent components of the shadow prices corresponding to these constraints. The vector 
of exogeneous variables Z2ht is therefore a determinant of the shadow price, which is not correlated 
with λih.  
If the shadow prices are unknown and do not appear in the consumption function 5.2.2, their 
influence are included into the residual, so that the specific effect αih of the consumption function 
(with a residual uiht = αih + εiht) contains λih. Therefore, the coefficients of the endogeneous variables 
Z1ht in the consumption function are subject to an endogeneity bias, which makes their cross-section, 
and time-series estimates different, while the exogeneous variables have coefficients, which do not 
differ between the two dimensions. Thus, the part of the shadow prices, which is explained by Z1ht, 
can be recovered by the endogeneity bias (in the consumption function), as revealed by the difference 
between the cross-section and time-series estimates of the coefficients of Z1ht. 
Indeed, the marginal propensity to consume with respect to Z1ht, when considering the effect 
of the shadow prices πjht on consumption, can be written:  
(5.2.3) dxiht/dZ1ht= dgi/dZ1ht + Σj (dgi/dπjht).(dπjht/dZ1ht).  
The second term differs between cross-section and time-series variations because of the endogeneity 
bias in the shadow price propensity with respect to Z1ht. So, comparing two different households 
surveyed in the same period, this bias adds to the direct consumption propensity with respect to Z1ht, as 
estimated on time-series. This parameter will therefore differ between cross-section and time-series 
estimations. For instance, the influence of the head’s age cohort or income may differ on cross-
sections and time-series if the shadow prices depend on cohort effects or relative income position 
(note that the same can occur for monetary prices). Hence the comparison of estimations computed on 
cross-sections and time-series reveals the difference of the shadow price system between two 
households.  
The component Σj dgi/dπjht.dπjht/dZ1ht of the marginal propensity of endogeneous variables can 
be used to reveal the variation of shadow prices over Z1ht, dπjht/dZ1ht, since it can be computed by 










































8We consider here only the direct effect through the price of good i : γii.dπi/dZ1 of the variables Z1ht, so 
that dπi/dZ1 = [βi
(c.s.) -βi
(t.s.)]/γii. The price effect γii is supposed to be the same for monetary and shadow 





1ht. Under the homogeneity assumption (of degree m) of the shadow prices over variables 




1ht. However, this 
homogeneity assumption is quite strong, and we will prefer to compute only the change in the shadow 
logarithmic prices. Let us call Ia and Iq respectively the average absolute and quadratic indexes for the 
absolute and quadratic changes in the shadow logarithmic price:  
Ia(π
v) = (1/H).Σh {(1/T-1) Σt Σi wi.|dlnπiht|} and  
Iq(π








We compute the shadow prices by estimating a Quadratic Demand System separately for the 
two types of households. However since the non-violating population is much more numerous, it is not 
easy to compare the endogeneity biases between the two populations. Moreover, the estimation is not 
precise enough for the violating households (see Appendix V for details). Thus, our preferred 
estimation was performed on the whole population with a dummy variable indicating the violating 
households only for the logarithmic income and squared logarithmic income variables, which differ 
significantly (see section 4.3 and Table 3.4 in Appendix III). Therefore the variations of the shadow 
prices indicate the changes in the conditions of choice for the two populations, weighted by the 
differences between the same cross-section and the time-series estimates (except for income). 
Table 6 and Table 4.1 (in Appendix IV) present an average of the shadow price absolute 
differences between two periods for the violating and non-violating populations. The price elasticities 
differ somewhat in various estimations. The shadow prices heavily depend on the value of the price 
marginal propensity to consume the good i (γii).  We calibrate it under the Frisch constraint between 








i  are respectively 
the direct price-elasticity and the income-elasticity for good i, ϖ the Frisch income flexibility 
(calibrated as 0.5 as recommended by Selvanathan 1993, Chapter 6) and βi the estimated coefficient of 










































Index of Quadratic Changes of the Logarithmic Shadow Prices 
 
All Expenditures  Food at Home  Housing  Clothing 
   Iq(π
v)       (dlnπiht)
2   (dlnπiht)
2  (dlnπiht)
2
  NV   V    NV          V              NV       V  NV       V   
Period 
 
1987-88       1.290  1.498    0.078      0.109         0.070  0.086    0.031    0.022 
    (.010)     (.021)    (.005)       (.013)  (.003)  (.006)  (.001)     (.001) 
1988-89       1.500  1.665    0.098       0.137  0.080  0.119  0.037    0.025  
    (.006)     (.014)    (.007)        (.017)  (.003)  (.009)  (.001)     (.001) 
1989-90       1.835  2.039    0.159       0.204  0.134  0.172  0.063    0.039 
    (.005)     (.011)    (.015)        (.031)  (.007)  (.016)  (.002)     (.002) 
   
Legend. 
NV = Non-violating households 
V = Violating households 
Index
18. I q(π
v) = {(1/H).Σh [(1/T-1) Σt Σi wi.(dlnπiht)
2]}
0.5 
Estimation. 1987-1990 under additivity and homogeneity constraints, on Between and Within 
Transforms for 1987-1990. See Table 3.4 in Appendix III for the specification on 
instrumented total expenditures. 
Computation of the shadow prices. dlnπiht =∑i (dπiht /dZ1ht).dZ1ht. The marginal propensity dpvi/dZ1h is computed with the price marginal 
propensity γii (indexes TP2, TP2’ in Table 4.1 of Appendix IV). Only changes dZ1h of log-income and its square, logarithmic age of the head 
and the proportion of children in the family are taken into account
19.  
Computation of the variances. See Appendix VI 
 
Three main results : 
 
(i) The variations of shadow prices are significantly different from zero
20 for almost all groups 
of commodities. So, these shadow prices may distort the optimal households’ consumption choices. 
 
                                                           
18An index of absolute variations leads to similar results. Estimations on pooled cross-sections and first differences under different 
hypotheses upon the price coefficient used to compute the shadow prices and the differentiation of the two populations in the estimation, give 
also similar results (see Table 4.1 and 4.2 in Appendix IV). 
19When adding the logarithmic relative prices to endogeneous variables Z1ht supposed to contain these four determinants, one must use price 
parameters which depend, for cross-sections on quarter price changes and differences between social categories, and for time-series, on 
annual price changes. The difference between the four social categories are known only for one period, so that the cross-section and time-
series estimates of the price parameters may be similar. The difference between cross-section and times-series estimates is probably due to 
random factors. Thus, it seems better to take only the four determinants into account. 
 








































8(ii) The change in the logarithmic shadow prices between two periods increases significantly 
during the period: this increase is particularly important between 1989 and 1990, when inflation, 
households income variation and economic institutions experienced a dramatic change. This proves 
the appearance or disappearance of constraints or the change in non-monetary resources, especially for 
the violating households.  
 
(iii) The change in the logarithmic shadow prices appear to be greater for the violating 
households, by 11% to 16% for the quadratic distance in table 6 (for different specification of the 
consumption function and of the calibration of the price coefficient used to compute the shadow 
prices, the changes are even greater, see tables in Appendix IV). Table 6 shows that this phenomenon 
appears for almost all periods concerning Food at Home, Housing and Clothing expenditures (which 
sum to 74% of all expenditures). Thus, it seems overall that, between 1987 and 1990, the violating 
households are confronted to significantly greater changes in their environment than the non-violating.  
  
The change in shadow prices revealed by the endogeneity bias on cross-section estimates thus 
seems to be important for both populations, and significantly greater for the violating households 
during this period. Non-rational behavior, as obtained by our non-parametric tests, may thus be due to 
special choice conditions which can be rationally faced by the households, but which cannot be taken 























































































The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the current discussion on the compatibility of 
consumers’ behaviour in "real" life with the choice consistency axioms. The computation of non-
parametric tests leads to three main results. First, it shows theoretically that non respect of rationality 
axioms (SARP, GARP, WARP) does not necessarily mean a non-rational behavior. Second, the tests 
on Polish Consumer Panel Data confirm the theoretical result. They seem robust. Indeed, we are using 
a panel data covering a period of very high price variations and less real income changes (budget 
intersections are therefore more likely to occur, so are violations of the axioms). Prices are quarterly 
observed and differentiated by socio-professional category (the computation of quantities is therefore 
good), the power of the tests in the sense of Bronars is satisfying. We find that for the violating 
households, the set of SARP violating couples, the set of GARP violating couples and the set of 
WARP violating couples, coincide. A theoretical consequence is that these households only apparently 
violate the rationality axioms. The apparent violation is due to the fact that these households change 
their preferences over the period. Third, the logit and demand system estimates confirm the above 
empirical result. Indeed, the higher the decrease of real expenditure per UC, the higher the probability 
of violation. It suggests that apparent irrationality is due to a change in choice conditions, due itself to 
new constraints occurring (subsistence constraints) over the period or to the change in non-monetary 
resources (the disappearing of queuing). A test of an econometric model of shadow prices seems to 
confirm this explanation. Two consequences can be derived : First, it is important, when estimating a 
demand system, to separate the violating consumers by a non-parametric test, so that the remaining 
population conforms better to the theoretical assumptions of such estimations (stability, homogeneity 
and symmetry of price effects)
21. Second, it is also important, among the violating consumers, to 
separate the true violating consumers, who do not change their preference over the period, from the 
apparent violating, who change their preferences, by comparing the separate violations of the three 
axioms WARP, GARP and SARP. Moreover, instead of eliminate directly the true violating 
households from the data set, one could estimate the household's shadow prices and use them in the 
estimation of the Demand System. 
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8APPENDIX I  
 
Remark. It is obvious that when the set of SARP violating couples is equal to the set of GARP violating 
couples then SARP⇔GARP. 
 
Lemma 1.  
1. [SARP ⇔ GARP] implies [TR ⇔ RS ⇔ R]. 
2. [TR ⇔ RS ⇔ R] implies [SARP  ⇔ GARP  ⇔ WARP] 
 
Proof. 
1. We know that RS implies R and R implies TR. By transitivity of the implication relation, we have RS implies 
TR. Then to show equivalence (up to reflexivities) between RS, R and TR, it is sufficient to show that TR 
implies RS when SARP is equivalent to GARP. Let us recall that SARP ⇔ GARP means that [(Xi , Xj) ∈ TR, 
i≠j ⇒ (Xj , Xi)  ∈ TR
c]  ⇔ [(Xi , Xj)  ∈ TR ⇒ (Xj , Xi)  ∈ RS
c] where TR
c and RS
c are respectively the 
complements of TR and RS. This obviously implies that TR coincides with RS, up to reflexivities : R = TR and 
R = RS + {(X, X)}. 
2. The result follows obviously from the fact that TR, RS and R coincides up to reflexivities (according to 




Proof of typology’s case 2.1.2.1. 
According to lemma 1, R and TR coincides. Since TR is by definition transitive then R is also transitive (R is 
however not antisymmetric since WARP and SARP are violated). R is reflexive and transitive and can therefore 
be expanded in a preorder (Szpilrajn 1930). R can be "represented" by a utility function. If R is the agent’s true 
preference over the period then since we have assumed the agent to fulfill the optimizing condition, she 
maximizes a utility function. Hence the agent should respect GARP (and SARP and WARP which are here 
equivalent). R is therefore not the agent’s true preference relation and her preference has changed at least once 
















































Counter-example in typology’s case 2.1.2.2 : violation due to preference changing. 
Let us restrict ourselves to the set {x1 , x2 , x3 , x4} and let us suppose R the revealed preference relation to be a 
preorder (x1 PR x2 ,  x1 PR x3 , x1 PR x4 , x2 IR x3 IR x4), and let us suppose RS the revealed strict preference 
structure to have the following structure (x1 PRS x2 ,  x1 PRS x3 , x1 PRS x4 , x2 IRS x3 , x2 JRS x4 , x3 JRS x4) where 
JRS is the incomparability
22 in the sense of RS. It is easy to see that TR the transitive closure of R coincides with 
R. It is also easy to see that both SARP and GARP are violated and the set of GARP violation couples is 
included in the set of SARP violation couples. However R is a preorder and can therefore be represented by a 
utility function. Like in typology 2.1.2.1 we can conclude in this case that R is not the agent true preference 






Counter-example in typology’s case 2.2.2.2 : violation due to preference structure or to preference 
changing. 
For simplicity, let us restrict ourselves to the set {x1 , x2 , x3}. It is easy to see that R the revealed preference 
relation has necessarily the structure (x1 PR x2 PR x3 IR x1) or (x1 PR x2 IR x3 IR x1) if we want TR the transitive 
closure of R to have the following structure x1 ITR x2 ITR x3 ITR x1. That leads to a violation of both SARP and 
WARP, and the set of WARP violation couples is included in the set of SARP violation couples. R is obviously 
acyclic, so the violation of SARP and WARP may be caused by the acyclic structure of R despite the fact the 
agent is rational in the traditional sense of Richter. However may be the acyclic structure of R is itself due to the 
non stability of the agent’s preference over the period, R is therefore, in this latter case, not the agent’s true 
preference. 
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Table 3.1  
Means and standard deviations of variables used in the Polish panel analyses 
 
 1987 1988 1989 1990








Real total  per  cu 
expenditure index 
(1987=100) 
100 105.7 118.6 79.9

























































Average budget shares 
 
 ____________________________________________________ 
 Budget  shares    1987  1988  1989  1990 
 ____________________________________________________ 
 Food        0.432  0.400  0.435  0.483 
  Alcohol and tobacco  0.041 0.037  0.031  0.129 
 Clothes      0.129  0.141  0.145  0.096 
 Dwelling      0.110  0.112  0.125  0.097 
 Energy      0.033  0.039  0.022  0.039 
  Health and hygiene   0.026  0.024  0.020  0.026 
  Transp. and communic.  0.050  0.062  0.063  0.066 
  Culture and entertain.   0.066  0.078  0.075  0.080 
 Other      0.028  0.025  0.020  0.031 
  Financial operations   0.087  0.081  0.057  0.050 












































Violation Rates According to Various Socio-economic Characteristics 
Logistic Function Estimates 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                        Parameter       Standard      Wald        Pr > 





  INTERCEPT               -3.1525  0.2755    130.9421    0.0001 
 %Change in real per CU  
total expenditure (88-87)            0.2218    0.1959           1.2809     0.2577 
  %Change in real per CU  
total expenditure (89-88)            0.4830  0.2125     5.1645     0.0231 
  %Change in real per CU  
total expenditure (90-89)            0.8111   0.1843    19.3713     0.0001 
 Change in food budget coeff (88-87)           0.4726   0.7823        0.3649       0.5458 
 Change in food budget coeff (89-88)          0.8673    0.6761      1.6457    0.1996 
 Change in food budget coeff (90-89)         0.8082  0.6384         1.6027      0.2055 
 Change in family size (88-87)         -0.1307   0.1316       0.9865     0.3206 
 Change in family size (89-88)         -0.2744   0.1631       2.8289     0.0926 
 Change in family size (90-89)          0.2834   0.1103       6.6050     0.0102 
Family head’s age (less than 40) (ref) 
Family head’s age  (41-60)            -0.0227  0.1705       0.0178     0.8939 
Family head’s age  more than 60         -0.1750   0.2693         0.4224      0.5157 
Location (large city) (ref) 
Location (average size city)              0.3327    0.2370      1.9697     0.1605  
Location (small town)               -0.2552   0.3553      0.5158       0.4726   
Location (countryside)                0.3124                0.2128       2.1555      0.1421 
Education  (college-university  level)(ref)      
Education (average level)           -0.1140                 0.1643                         0.4817                        0.4877 
Education (primary school level)          -0.0311     0.2934      0.0112       0.9157 
Wage earners (ref) 
Farmers                0.0174                 0.2269                         0.0059                        0.9389 
Mixte: farmers and wage earners           -0.3551    0.2343           2.2966        0.1297 
Retired                  0.3624     0.2329        2.4218        0.1197 
Survey’s quarter (1) (ref) 
Survey’s quarter (2)              0.1609       0.2052         0.6154          0.4328 
Survey’s quarter (3)                0.4147       0.2022          4.2074        0.0402 
Survey’s quarter (4)              0.3766     0.2121           3.1531        0.0758 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number of Observations: 3630 
Model Fitting Information and Testing Global Null Hypothesis BETA=0 
 
                                     Intercept 
                       Intercept        and 
         Criterion       Only       Covariates    Chi-Square for Covariates 
 
         AIC            1769.618      1759.969         . 
         SC             1775.815      1902.500         . 
         -2 LOG L       1767.618      1713.969       53.649 with 22 DF (p=0.0002) 
         Score              .             .          55.472 with 22 DF (p=0.0001) 
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                         Concordant = 63.4%          Somers' D = 0.287 
                         Discordant = 34.7%           Gamma     = 0.292 
                         Tied       =  1.9%                Tau-a     = 0.035 











































Income Elasticities (QUAIDS) 
 
 
 Cross-section  Elasticities  First-difference 
Elasticities 
  NV V NV V 


























































































Specification: wiht = αi + Σj γij ln pjt + βi ln [mht/a(pt)] + {[λi/b(pt)] ln [m/a(p)]}
2 + Wht.γi + uiht with ln a(pt) =  α0 + Σj αi ln pit +0.5 ΣiΣj γij ln pit. 
ln pjt  and b(pt) = Πi pit
βi  
Logarithm of total Expenditures instrumented. 
Other determinants : logarithmic age of the head, proportion of children in the family, relative logarithmic prices, education and location 
dummies, quarter dummies for each year. The true price index is approximated by a Stone price index. 
Estimation  : by convergence, third iteration for both dimensions, on the integrability parameter b(p). Additivity and homogeneity 
constrained. 












































Proportion of Social Classes (%) 
 













                                                                 1987 
 
  NV V  NV V  NV  V  NV V  NV  V 
O.25  143 13  918 65  1282 89  916 63  131  10 
  4.22 5.42 27.08  27.08  37.82 37.08 27.02  26.25  3.86  4.17 
0.15  223 21  701 48  1592 109  675 47  199  15 
  6.58 8.75 20.68  20.00  46.9  45.10 19.91  19.58  5.87  6.25 
0.10  266 26  563 38  1770 123  556 35  235  18 
  7.85  10.83 16.61 15.83 52.21  16.40  51.25 14.58 6.93  7.50 
     1988   
 
        
0.10  8.2 7.5 16.8  18.3  51.6 50.4 15.6  12.9  7.7  10.8 
0.25  4.2 3.8 27.1  27.1  38.5 37.9 25.5  25.4  4.7  5.8 
                                                                 1989                    
 
0.10  8.9  10.4 16.3 15.8 48.4  53.3  16.3 12.1 10.1  8.3 
0.25  5.10 4.17 26.0 29.8 36.3  39.2  25.2 20.8 7.4  6.3 
                                                                  1990 
 
0.10  5.84 5.92 17.0 15.4 51.9  53.3  16.2 15.00  9.0  10. 
0.25  2.42 1.25 27.6 26.7 37.2  39.2  27.7 25.8 5.0  7.  9 
 
Poverty criteria: 
                               (i) Income per unit of consumption below the first quintile 
               (ii) Total expenditure per unit of consumption smaller than (1- k) time the average for a reference population. 
               (iii) budget share for food at home greater than (1+k) the average for a reference population. 
Definition of social classes:  
The rich are defined symmetrically, the quasi-poor (respectively the quasi-rich) as having two over the three attributes of the poor 
(respectively the rich) and not being rich (respectively the poor) for the third. 






Social Class Changes (%) 
 
k; n of classes    87/88  88/89  89/90  Average
 
0.10; 1  NV  0.460  0.592  0.524  0.525 
       0.10;1  V  0.429  0.554  0.517  0.500 
 0.10; >1  NV  0.079  0.168  0.112  0.120 
0.10;>1 V  0.092  0.163  0.100  0.118 
0.25;>1 NV  0.038  0.145  0.077  0.088 
0.25;>1 V  0.042  0.133  0.088  0.875 
 
Proportion of households changing to another social classes between two years, either proximate (number of change=1) or not  (number of 










































   
 
Table 4.1. Absolute Changes in Logarithmic Shadow Prices 
 
 
          TP1       TP2                DP         TP1’                TP2’       DP’ 
 
Period     NV     V     NV     V      NV     V    NV     V    NV     V    NV    V                 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
87-88 0.193 0.154 0.286 0.315 0.188 0.258 0.135 0.108 0.108 0.141 0.130    0.186 
 
88-89 0.214 0.173 0.119 0.351 0.208 0.287 0.148 0.122 0.118 0.157 0.142 0.210 
 
89-90 0.282 0.217 0.131 0.441 0.274 0.358 0.197 0.152 0.157 0.196 0.188 0.262 
 
Legend :  
Average of the absolute values of the shadow prices changes: (1/CardH).Σh [(1/T-1) Σt Σi wi.|dlnπiht|] 
V =  Violating Households 
NV = Non-Violating Households   
TP1 = Total population, budget share equalized : price marginal propensity = γii
TP1’ = Total population, expenditure equalized: price marginal propensity = γii - wi
TP2 = Total population, budget share equalized and differenced income and squared income coefficients 
TP2’  =  Total population, expenditure equalized and differenced income and squared income coefficients 
DP  = Different populations (violating versus non-violating), budget share equalized 
DP’ = Different populations (violating versus non-violating), expenditure equalized 
 
 
Table 4.2. Indexes of changes in logarithmic shadow prices 
       







No Violation (NV) 
NV  NV  V  V  NV  V  NV  V  NV  V 







                
1987-88  0.327  0.286  1.151  0.315 0.007 0.039 0.007 0.034  0.002 0.002 
 (.006)    (.012)    (.0005) (.0026) (.0002) (.0015)  (.0001)  (.0003)
                
1988-89  0.368  0.119  1.286  0.351 0.008 0.049 0.005 0.047  0.003 0.002 
 (.004)    (.009)    (.0005) (.0035) (.0002) (.0022)  (.0001)  (.0003)
                
1989-90  1.494  0.131  1.565  0.441 0.129 0.073 0.007 0.069  0.034 0.003 
 (.003)    (.006)    (.015)  (.006)  (.0021) (.0037)  (.0017)  (.0004)
 
Notes: 
Estimation : Separately on pooled cross section and first differences. The variance of the difference (βcs -βfd) is 
taken as the sum of the variance of the two estimators. Estimation TP2. 
Quadratic index : Iq(π




v) = (1/H).Σh [(1/T-1) Σt Σi wi.|dlnπiht|] 












































5.1. REVELATION OF THE SHADOW PRICES 
 
  Two problems arise in the computation of shadow prices :  
 
First, the shadow prices are computed in section 5.2 by equalizing the estimated budget share 
on cross-section plus the shadow price effect and the estimated budget share on time series. It assumes 
that the constant term is the same in the two estimations. Thus, the levels of the revealed shadow 
prices are disputable. However their variations between two periods, say dlpvit =∑i (dπi/dZ1h).dZ1ht with 
dπi/dZ1h = [βi
(c.s.) -βi
(t.s.)]/ γii , are more reliable.  
 
  Second, it is also possible to reveal the variation of the shadow prices by equalizing the 
expenditures instead of the budget shares. Let us consider a logarithmic equation : 
Log Ci = Z. βi
 (c.s.) + ui
(c.s.) = Z. βi
 (t.s.) + Ei log πi + ui
(t.s.) with E’i the direct price elasticity and Ci 
the consumption of good i. 
By separating the parameters of income from other determinants, we get dlogπi/dZ1h = 
 [βi
 (c.s.) -βi
 (t.s.)]/(γii - wi) with wi the average budget share for commodity i (this is easily proved by 
equalizing the income elasticities of this logarithmic specification with the elasticity computed by an 
AI specification).  
 
Thus, to reveal the shadow prices, the two above hypotheses amount to divide the difference 
between cross-section and time series estimates either by γii or by (γii - wi). 
 
 
5.2. ESTIMATION FOR THE TWO SUB-POPULATIONS 
 
Suppose the estimates of the vector of parameters for some equation y = xβ + u, are   and 
for the estimations over two sub-populations of sizes n and n’ with n < n’. The estimates can be 
written : β = β + tσ and  = β’ +t’σ with β and β’ as the true parameters and σ the standard error of 
the parameters which is supposed to be the same for the two parameters. We suppose also that β and 
are independent, E(t) = E(t’) = 0, σ(t) = σ(t’) = s and ∂s/∂N < 0 where N is the population’s size. 
This implies : β -  = (β - β’) + (t-t’)σ and Var(β -  ) = 2s
β ˆ
' ˆ β
ˆ ' ˆ β
ˆ
' ˆ β
ˆ ' ˆ β ˆ ' ˆ β
2σ
2. The difference between the 
estimates on the two population is not biased with respect to 0, but decreases with the size of the sub-
populations. Therefore, the difference between cross-sections and time-series estimates, which is a 
component of the shadow prices’ formulas, is probably greater for the smaller population and that may 
artificially increase the variations of the shadow prices. Hence the shadow prices revealed by the 
estimations with respect to the violating households are over-estimated compared to those computed 
by a regression over the non-violating households (which are about ten times more numerous). 
 
On the other hand, estimating the difference (β
(c.s.) - β
(t.s.)) on the whole population and 
estimating the shadow prices for the two populations with these estimates can be considered as 
misspecified. Indeed we proved that the consumption behavior differs between the two populations at 
least for the income parameters (Table 3.4). The income and squared income coefficients are well 
estimated for both populations, so that our preferred method to compute the shadow prices consists in 
estimating β
(c.s.) and β
(t.s.) on the whole population with dummies indicating the violating and non-












































Distribution of the Quadratic Index of Shadow Prices 
  
 
1.  Computation of the variances : 
 
The quadratic index writes :  Iq(π
v) = {(1/H).Σh [(1/T-1) Σt Σi wi.(dlnπiht)
2]}
0.5 .  
 
(i)  The logarithmic virtual prices dlnπiht are normally distributed as linear transforms of 
the differences between cross-sections and time-series parameters (which are, by 
assumption, normal). The variance of dlnπiht is :  
Var (dlnπiht) = (dZ1ht) Var(βB-βW)(dZ1ht)’,  
with Var(βB-βW) = Var(βB) + Var(βW)  : see Baltagi 1995, p.69. 
  
(ii)  The variance of (dlnπiht)² can be computed using the formula, characterizing normal 
variables (here dlnπiht) :  
(5.1) Var((dlnπiht)²) = 2σi
4 + 4 mi
2σi
2   
with mi  and  σi respectively the mean and standard-error of dlnπi. Thus, under an 
independence assumption, the variance of the square of the quadratic index Iq is the 
weighed average of these variances: 
Var[Σiwi (dlnπiht )²] = Σiwi
2 [2σi
4 + 4 miσi
2]. 
 
  (iii)   Finally, we assume (hypothesis 1.iii) that Iq is normal, so that the formula (5.1) applies 
also to this index and its square : Var(Iq
2) = 2(VarIq)
2 + 4(E(Iq))
2.Var(Iq). The positive solution for this 
equation writes Var(Iq) = - Iq
2 + [Iq
4 + 0.5 Var(Iq
2)]
0.5. The different elements of this formula are taken 
as the average of Iq
2 and its variance over each sub-population composed respectively of the violating 
and non-violating households. 
 
2.  Distribution of the quadratic index Iq : 
 
As a weighted average of non-centered heteroskedastic normal variables, Iq has no known 
distribution (let us point out however that there exist in mathematical-statistics - in very special cases 
unfortunately - some non-centered limit theorems). According to the tests (β1 = 7.42 and β2 = 11.25 
are higher than 1.96 and the Jarque-Bera statistic s = 181.58 is higher than the limit of a χ
2(2)), the 
distribution of Iq is not a normal distribution. Nevertheless we will assume (see hypothesis 1.iii above) 
Iq to be normal since a Monte Carlo experiment for 300 households and 80 draws shows that its 
histogram is close to the one of a normal distribution. Therefore we use the computed variances to test 
whether the quadratic index is significantly different from zero, and greater for the violating.  


















































1.22628 1.22635 1.22642 1.22648 1.22655 1.22661 1.22668 1.22674 1.22681 1.22687
    
Legend. 
X-axis : Iq. 
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